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Abstract
Models of strategic debt predict that public debt increases with polarization, meas-
ured by the ideological distance between the government and its likely successor. 
Conversely if voters are both short-termist and also more likely to switch their vote 
for parties offering higher spending and public good provision when the electorate 
is ideologically concentrated, then debt can fall with polarization, measured by dis-
persion of ideological preferences in the electorate. Using time-varying polarization 
measures generated from ideology data from party manifestos, we find a sizable and 
statistically significant negative association between debt levels in OECD countries 
and ideological polarization in the electorate.
Keywords Public debt · Strategic debt · Ideological polarization
JEL Classification H63
1 Introduction
In 2010 average central government debt in the OECD stood at 69% of GDP. In 
1974 this figure stood at 23%, down from 88% in 1945. Moreover, at any point in 
time there is substantial cross-country variation. 2010 debt levels varied from 22% 
in Switzerland to 189% in Japan. Whilst it is widely recognized that these outcomes 
are the product of imperfect political processes, a full explanation represents a for-
midable challenge to political economics.1
 * Andrew Pickering 
 AndrewPickering@york.ac.uk
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1 As noted by Alesina and Perotti (1995) efficiency-based explanations (e.g. Barro, 1979) alone cannot 
explain either the levels or variation in public debt observed across countries and time. Recent contribu-
tions include Battaglini and Coate (2008) and Yared (2010). Eslava (2011) provides an excellent recent 
survey.
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Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) formalized the 
idea of ‘strategic debt’. Given the likelihood of being replaced in the future, an ide-
ologically motivated incumbent will encumber future (ideologically distant) gov-
ernments with debt. The greater the ideological distance between the parties, the 
greater the level of debt.2
On the other hand, as we discuss in the next section polarized preferences serve 
to weaken electoral mechanisms which themselves plausibly underpin proclivity to 
debt. The novel hypothesis is that polarization as defined by greater ideological dis-
persion in the electorate will instead reduce government debt.
This paper investigates the relationship between central government debt and ide-
ological polarization empirically. Figure 1 presents a simple cross-country correla-
tion between central government debt levels in 2010 and the polarization measure 
generated from the World Values Survey used by Lindqvist and Östling (2010) in 
their analysis of the size of government. The data sample here is a cross section of 
quite diverse countries.3 The scatter plot reveals a negative raw correlation between 
polarization and debt. Prima facie this is supportive of the argument advanced in the 
present paper, and somewhat contrary to the strategic debt literature. Nonetheless it 
is not possible to infer causality for the standard reason that analysis of cross-coun-
try performance omits considerable unobserved heterogeneity.
Below the competing hypotheses are tested using time-varying polarization 
measures generated from ideology data from political manifestos and observed vot-
ing behaviour. One important feature of these data is that they vary over time. Previ-
ous analyses of the relationship between fiscal policy and ideological polarization 
have only used cross-sectional analysis, or in the context of panel data has relied on 
fixed measures of ideology for party positioning—wherein time variation is gener-
ated through variation in seats.4 Within countries the distance between parties is not 
fixed over time; hence, the data used here represent an improvement over the previ-
ous work. Within-country variation also allows us to control for unobserved fixed 
country-specific characteristics that might drive debt.
The econometric analysis consistently finds a statistically significant negative 
relationship between central government debt and ideological polarization in voter 
3 The econometric analysis below focuses only on established OECD democracies for three reasons. 
First, both our model and the strategic debt literature rely on democratic processes. Second, debt default 
concerns have generally been greater outside the OECD. Third, over a meaningful time-span the mani-
festos data, which we exploit to generate time-varying ideological dispersion (polarization) measures, are 
only available for the OECD sample.
4 For example Alt and Lassen (2006). Relatedly Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and Perotti and Kon-
topoulos (2002) use cross-sectional policy to investigate the effect of fragmented government on fiscal 
policy.
2 Persson and Svensson (1989) model preference heterogeneity over total government expenditure whilst 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) focus on the composition of expenditure. In support of Persson and Sven-
sson (1989) Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds that right-wing governments increase debt whilst left-wing 
governments reduce debt when faced with the likelihood of being replaced. However this is a different, 
and not mutually exclusive, hypothesis from that pertaining to the ideological distance between the two 
parties. For example in Persson and Svensson’s (1989) model the impetus for debt (given a conservative 
incumbent) is stronger when the ideological distance between the two parties is bigger.
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preferences. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of a number of controls and, 
in particular, is strengthened when a measure of fragmentation (which is distinct 
from polarization) is included. In contrast to the strategic debt literature we find that 
it is ideological dispersion in the electorate, rather than ideological distance between 
the government and their potential replacement, that correlates with debt. A one 
standard deviation increase in polarization correlates with lower central government 
debt by about 12% of GDP. To identify exogenous variation in polarization, we use 
lagged media penetration data and also the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall on 
European politics. Campante and Hojman (2013) and Melki and Pickering (2014) 
both argue for a causal relationship from increased media penetration to reduced 
polarization. Using the alternative instrumental variables the results hold up in sup-
port of a causal negative relationship between polarization and debt.
Furthermore, the negative relationship between debt and polarization is found to 
be stronger when ‘government efficiency’ is weaker. This latter variable is defined 
by institutional independence from political pressures. As such we would expect 
a priori that governments scoring highly on this measure would be more able to 
resist voter demands for debt. The data thus also support this line of reasoning. The 
negative relationship is also found to be especially strong when fiscal transparency 
is high. Whilst the ‘treatment’ of transparency is evidently far from random, this 
evidence can also be reconciled with the argument that electoral pressure for debt 
when there are many swing voters (i.e. when preferences are not polarized) is par-
ticularly strong when voters are more able to attribute fiscal policy outcomes to the 
incumbent.
The paper contributes to the growing literature examining the economic conse-
quences of political polarization. Azzimonti (2011) theorizes that the common pool 
problem in public service provision is exacerbated, causing higher taxes and lower 
growth, and Woo (2003, 2005) and Azzimonti and Talbert (2014) find increased 
policy variability and hence subsequent greater macroeconomic volatility. Canes-
Wrone and Park (2012) argue for a ‘reverse political business cycle’ in which uncer-
tainty over the future policy environment increases with polarization thus dampen-
ing investment prior to elections.
On the other hand, Testa (2010 and 2012) and Brown et al (2011) theorize that 
polarization can reduce corruption. Melki and Pickering (2020) find supportive evi-
dence for this hypothesis using data from the USA. The findings in the present paper 
are compatible with this literature. The basic argument here is that polarization can 
weaken electoral competition and in doing so act to reduce policy failures that can 
emerge from the political process.5
The next section develops the theoretical argument, Sect. 3 contains the empirical 
analysis and Sect. 4 concludes.
5 Relatedly Schultz (2008) also models voters as poorly informed, finding conditions under which longer 
term lengths (hence reduced accountability) can be an optimal way of reducing policy distortions.
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2  Theoretical mechanisms
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) exposited the now seminal proposition of ‘strategic 
debt’. In this model the incumbent has preferences over policy, for example prefer-
ring welfare provision to tax cuts and anticipates possible replacement by an ideo-
logically distinct successor government. By increasing debt the incumbent gets more 
of the public good that they like today and limits the capacity of its successor to 
pursue its own agenda in the next period as they will inherit the debt obligation. In 
this instance the relevant measure of polarization is the ideological distance between 
the incumbent and its successor and we have hypothesis 1 (H1):
H1 (Strategic debt): Debt will increase the greater the ideological distance between 
the incumbent and its likely replacement.
Nonetheless both incumbent and opposition parties’ ideological positioning are 
endogenous to the preferences of the electorate, and the wider political economics 
literature identifies many potential mechanisms through which these preferences and 
in particular their dispersion affects policy. This matters when candidates are office-
motivated, rather than policy-motivated as in the strategic debt model.
Probabilistic voting models are a standard workhorse of this literature and in 
these greater dispersion of preferences in general acts to dull the responsiveness 
of voting to economic policy.6 When the electorate is ideologically concentrated 
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Fig. 1  Scatter plot of central government debt as a percentage of GDP in 2010 and ideological polariza-
tion by country. Ideological polarization is measured using the standard deviation of the ‘Gov’ question 
in the World Values Survey (see Lindqvist & Östling, 2010)
6 Persson and Tabellini (2000) discuss these models and their widespread use in the discipline.
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electoral reward. An important premise for this paper is that the incentives for poli-
cymakers to increase debt are potentially sharpened. Conversely if the electorate is 
ideologically polarized then voter-responsiveness to economic policy, and in turn 
the electoral incentive to increase debt, are both reduced.7
A frequent complaint of the public choice literature is that political decision-
making is short-termist and by construction short-termist policy entails higher debt 
levels.8 A plausible source of this myopia is the electorate. Voters may discount pub-
lic debt for a number of reasons. One possibility is imperfect information. Voters 
may not incur the cost of becoming fully informed about the state of public finances 
when the expected benefits of voting are vanishingly small. Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977) argue that voters suffer from ‘fiscal illusion’, in part induced by complexities 
in the fiscal system, and in part induced by ‘rational ignorance’ (Downs, 1957 & 
Tullock, 1967).9
Even under the strong assumptions of fully rational voters and transparent public 
accounts, the relevant borrowing data do not become available before a substantial 
lag and are then usually subject to further historical revisions.10 Cimadomo (2012) 
documents sizable and persistent differences between real time and end-of-sample 
data for the public debt-output ratio, so even motivated voters may not know even 
the direction of debt under a particular regime with confidence. As well as genu-
ine measurement difficulties Alt and Lassen (2006) document that public finances 
in many OECD countries are not wholly transparent. Even if voters were willing to 
incur the processing costs, the relevant information simply may not be available.
Relatedly Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) show that under circum-
stances of imperfect information, competent incumbents increase debt in order to 
distinguish themselves.11 However, and as with probabilistic voting models in gen-
eral, the capacity to improve the election-win probability through spending (and 
increased debt) falls under more polarized preferences as voters become less respon-
sive to spending.
Alternatively public debt may just be electorally popular. Such debt is typically 
paid back over decades, and many voters (in particular retirees, with notably higher 
than average turnout rates) simply may not be around in the future.12 There may be 
bequest motives, and aversion to private debt, within households, but in the context 
7 Relatedly, Adams et  al.(2017) show that non-moderate voters weight candidates’ ideological posi-
tions far more than moderate voters using survey data from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election 
Study. Arguably greater polarization means less moderate voters, hence a greater weight on ideology and 
a lower weight on material concerns.
8 Acharya and Rajan (2013) analyse the default decision when governments are myopic.
9 As an example of low general knowledge concerning public finances, about 59% of Americans told in 
a Washington Post/ABC News poll in 2013 that they believed that the federal deficit was growing whilst 
at that time it was not.
10 See Irwin (2015) on the substantial difficulties of providing accurate contemporaneous public debt 
data.
11 Aidt et al. (2011) find evidence from Portuguese municipalities in favour of this mechanism.
12 Song et al. (2012) also make this argument. In the empirical work below, public debt levels are found 
to be robustly correlated with the proportion of the population aged 65 and over. Alternatively Cukier-
man and Meltzer (1989) derived demand for public debt from `bequest-constrained’ individuals.
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of reducing public debt the bequest would implicitly be to society at large. Vot-
ers might conceivably discount the benefits of reducing public debt when they are 
spread across the population.
The argument that voters discount future debt should be recognized as distinct 
from traditional (opportunistic) models of pre-electoral spending and post-election 
retrenchment (Nordhaus, 1975).13 Ultimately neither ‘opportunistic’ nor ‘rational’ 
theories of spending cycles can explain variation in debt levels averaged over longer 
periods of time (i.e. including both election and non-election years). The time frame 
we have in mind for debt decisions is the long-run—in other words beyond electoral 
terms of office. Systematic discounting of public debt by the public, either founded 
in imperfect information or direct preferences, provides an impetus for explaining 
observed public debt levels.
The general lesson of the probabilistic voting literature is that greater dispersion 
in voter preferences dulls the electoral response to particular economic policies. If 
we also take the premise of short-termism in the electorate, then the vote-payoff to 
increased debt is reduced and we have hypothesis 2 (H2):
H2 (Electoral motives): Debt will fall with greater ideological dispersion in voter 
preferences.
3  Evidence
3.1  Data and empirical strategy
The dependent variable, taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), is total (domestic 
plus external) gross central government debt measured as a percentage of GDP.14 
The sample covers the period 1945–2010 in countries which have been OECD mem-
bers since 1975. The mechanism proposed in this paper, and also in the strategic 
debt literature, both emphasizes electoral concerns and hence established democra-
cies are the appropriate sample.
Figure  2 depicts these data, showing interesting variation across countries and 
over time. First in general the debt data, as would be expected for a stock variable, 
are clearly quite slow moving. Second, it is clear is that there are important uni-
versal time effects. Many countries ended the Second World War with large debt 
13 Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) restore voter rationality to this analysis using a signal-
extraction model when inferring incumbent competence. Recent empirical work on the presence of 
electoral deficit cycles in OECD countries is fairly mixed (Brender & Drazen, (2005); Shi & Svensson, 
(2006)).
14 Empirical work in this broad area focusses on the primary surplus rather than debt levels (e.g. Alt & 
Lassen, 2006; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). We prefer actual debt levels as a dependent variable because 
the primary surplus is defined as tax revenue minus expenditure before interest payments on debt are 
made. Given the presumption of solvency (which characterizes the OECD for most of the time), then 
countries with higher steady state debt levels are more predisposed towards a primary surplus. The pri-
mary surplus data therefore may quite often be systematically misleading in terms of representing chosen 
levels of public debt.
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obligations. In 1946 average public debt levels in the sample stood at 93% of GDP. 
Debt levels then fell as a percentage of GDP as they were paid off, and of course as 
GDP itself rose relatively quickly over the subsequent three decades, with average 
debt levels reaching their minimum (at 23.6% of GDP) in 1974. Since that time pub-
lic debt as a percentage of GDP has increased, for instance quite markedly follow-
ing the financial crisis of 2007/2008, rising to 69.4% in 2010, the most recent year 
for which data are available. There is also interesting cross sectional variation. Tak-
ing the whole sample period, public debt in Germany and Switzerland, respectively, 
averaged at 18.3% and 21.5%, whilst the averages for Great Britain and Belgium are, 
respectively, 78.1 and 78.6%. It seems reasonable to infer that debt aversion is not 
constant across countries.
The key explanatory variable, ideological polarization, is constructed using 
ideological data produced by the Manifestos Research Group (Budge et  al., 2001, 
and updated by Klingemann et  al., 2006).15 This source derives a unidimensional 
left–right ideology score produced at the level of the party, which varies across time 
(as manifestos of particular parties change per election), denoted  rilepjt for party p in 
country j in year t, which in principle varies between − 100 (extreme left) and + 100 
(extreme right). Within the OECD sample the leftmost observation, with a rile 
measure of − 68.1, is the Danish Socialist People’s Party in 1960, whilst the right-
most observation is the Australian Country party in 1954, with a rile measure of 
85. To construct a measure of polarization in voter preferences (POL) in an election 
year within a particular country we estimate the standard deviation of underlying 
ideology distribution using the formula
where Vpjt is the proportion of votes received by party p in the election. Thus in a 
two-party system (p = {L, R}) where both parties get 50% of the vote, and 
rile
L
= −10 and rile
R
= 10 , then the standard deviation is 10. If the parties’ respec-
tive ideology move to rile
L
= 10 and rile
R
= 30 , holding vote shares constant at 
50%, then the standard deviation is unaltered. If rile
L
= 10 and rile
R
= 50 , then the 
standard deviation increases to 20. Data for non-election years were obtained 
through linearly interpolating between the nearest election years. In the empirical 






















15 The manifestos data pass various external validation tests. For example country level averages of these 
data show that the Scandinavian countries are on average substantially more left-wing than say the US or 
Australia. Average ideology in Anglo Saxon countries such as the UK exhibit a marked drift to the right 
in the 1980s. Gabel and Huber (2000) argue that the MRG data are a good measure of ideology, as they 
correspond well with other data sources such as expert surveys (e.g. Castles and Mair (1984)) and data 
from the World Values Survey (WVS). Pickering and Rockey (2011) use the manifestos data to explore 
the relationship between government size, ideology and economic development.
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The resulting series for POLjt demonstrate interesting variation across time and 
space. The mean value for POLjt is 17.0 and its standard deviation is 6.95. The least 
polarized election in the sample was the German election of 1965 ( POLjt = 2.47 ). 
At face value this perhaps reflects the consensual approach to politics in this coun-
try following the Second World War.16 The most polarized election was the Finnish 
election of 1945 ( POLjt = 43.23)—this latter case reflects the presence of a politi-
cally strong communist party (the Finnish People’s Democratic League) together 
with overtly anti-Soviet centrist and right-wing movements that prioritized Finnish 
sovereignty.
A key advantage of the polarization measures used in this paper is that they vary 
across time as well as across countries. Hence, differences in the level of debt that 
may be due to time-invariant unobservable country characteristics (for example such 
as ‘German debt aversion’) may be controlled for via the use of fixed effects. In the 
UK, for example, politics were fairly polarized at the point of the 1945 general elec-
tion,17 and this shows up in the data as POLjt = 21.4 . The measure proceeded to 
decline, reflecting the ‘post-war consensus’ and in the 1959 general election POLjt 
reached its UK minimum of 4.32. An ideological divide started to re-emerge in the 
1970s peaking in 1983 at 28.3, reflecting Thatcher’s drive to the right, and Labour’s 
continued adherence to generalized public ownership then embodied in Clause 4 of 
its own constitution. More latterly, with the emergence of New Labour, polariza-















































Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)
Central Government Debt as a % of GDP
Fig. 2  Central government debt as a percentage of GDP
16 (Although closer examination of the data reveals quite a lot of variation within West Germany: for 
example in 1957 POLjt = 34.57.).
17 In 1945 the elected Labour party embarked on a significant expansion of the welfare state and mean-
ingfully differed in ideology from the Conservative party, led by Winston Churchill.
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Nonetheless it is also the case that, like the debt data, POLjt demonstrates consider-




 and voting behaviour are persis-
tent, and so the usable variation in this series is in the longer run.
Alternative polarization measures, for example generated from the World Values 
Survey (WVS),18 essentially represent a snapshot of a country at a given moment 
hence will not capture within-country variation across time. Nonetheless, the WVS 
permit a validation test of the POLjt measure used here. In particular the most recent 
WVS contains a question which asks ‘In political matters, people talk of “the left” 
and “the right.” How would you place your views on (a 1–10 Likert) scale, generally 
speaking?’. The correlation of the standard deviation of this measure with the coun-
try-level average POLj is 0.52. Countries which on average are measured to be more 
polarized according to our measure are also more polarized according to the WVS.
The variable POLjt is used in order to test H2 that reduced dispersion of prefer-
ences implies greater political competition and hence greater debt levels when cur-
rent spending is rewarded. However, as discussed above polarization as conceived 
in the strategic debt literature is distinct, in that it refers to distance between parties 
rather than dispersion in the electorate. In essence the further the incumbent from 
their expectation of future policy, the greater the level of debt. In order to separately 
test the strategic debt hypothesis a separate ‘government distance’ ( GOV_DISTjt ) 
measure is also used in the empirical analysis. This is measured as the absolute 
distance between a weighted measure of government ideology and mean ideol-
ogy in the electorate MEANjt defined above.
19 The maintained assumption here is 
that the current ideological mean in the population proxies for the expectation of 
the ideological disposition of future regimes. The correlation between POLjt and 
GOV_DISTjt in the annual data is 0.427; hence, the two are positively correlated as 
would be expected, but there is also some usable variation. Governments that are 
more distant from mean ideology are more prevalent when the electorate is more 
dispersed. In addition to this measure we also make use of the ideological distance 
between the two main parties ( TOP2_DISTjt ) and also the unweighted standard devi-
ation of the rilepjt ideology measure by all parties standing at each general election 
(denoted RILESDjt).
Figure 3 plots average debt levels within countries against averages of the polari-
zation measure POLj . This figure, like Fig. 1, is of course only suggestive, but taken 
at face value is again supportive of the hypothesis offered in this paper, that polari-
zation may reduce debt. Furthermore, the fact that Figs. 1 and 3 are consistent with 
each other supports the use of the manifesto-generated polarization data. The slope 
coefficient in Fig. 3 is equal to− 2 (with a p-value of 0.07); hence, a permanent one 
standard deviation (6.95) increase in polarization is statistically associated with a 
reduction of central government debt of 13.9% of GDP.
18 Lindqvist and Östling (2010) analyse the effect of polarization on the size of government using cross-
sectional measures derived from the WVS.
19 The weights are defined by the seat shares of the parties formally represented in government. Data for 
the parties in government were taken from the Database of Political Institutions.
 M. Melki, A. Pickering 
1 3
Figure 4 plots the evolution of cross-country year level averages of debt levels and 
polarization, POL
t
.20 Clearly debt levels have trended upwards over time since 1960, 
whilst average polarization has declined. Broadly speaking the early part of the sam-
ple is characterized by low debt and high polarization, whilst the latter part of the 
sample is characterized by high debt and low polarization.21 In a simple bivariate 
regression the slope coefficient is equal to − 3.97 (with a p-value of 0.003). Again, 
this figure certainly cannot be taken as evidence of a causal relationship. Nonethe-
less, the facts are at least consistent with the interpretation offered in this paper.
To investigate this relationship in more depth we turn to a regression analysis. 
Certain countries may be more debt averse than others, perhaps for historical rea-
sons. Likewise common time effects are also obviously important. If international 
borrowing rates increase, or business cycles and indeed growth are at all synchro-
nous, then debt levels may rise simultaneously across countries. For these reasons 
both fixed and time effects are included as standard in the regression analysis.
The regression analysis also includes standard control variables, following Pers-
son and Tabellini (2003) in their analysis of central government primary budget sur-
plus data. In particular we control for the natural log of real GDP per capita in con-
stant dollars (chain index),22 the degree of trade openness,23 the percentage of the 
population aged between 15 and 64, and the percentage of the population aged 65 
and above.24 The benchmark empirical specification is thus
where Djt is central government debt as a percentage of GDP in country j in year t. 
b
1
 is the principal parameter of interest. The hypothesis proposed here is that debt 
falls with polarization ( POLjt ), hence b1 < 0 , rather than b1 > 0 in the case of Ales-
ina and Tabellini (1990). The vector of controls are augmented with fixed effects, 

i
 and time effects 
t
 . In addition all estimation results are reported with standard 
errors clustered by country.
3.2  Ordinary least squares regression results
Column 1 of Table 1 presents the results of the benchmark estimation specification 
using annual data. The parameter estimate for b
1
 is somewhat smaller than in the raw 
correlations though remains, consistent with the theory above, negative and signifi-
cant with a p-value of 0.07. The negative statistical association survives in the pres-
ence of fixed country and year effects, as well as the control variables. These results 
Djt = b1POLjt + [controls]b� + i + t + jt
20 Whilst the debt and ideology data go back to 1945, the control variables are only available from 1960 
hence the formal econometric analysis focuses on the period 1960–2010.
21 One driver of the fall in average polarization is the decline of the European radical left after 1989 
(March & Mudde, 2005).
22 Following Persson and Tabellini (2003) these data were obtained from the Penn World Tables.
23 Measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. Source: World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI).
24 Data for the demographic controls were also obtained from the WDI.
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imply that a one standard deviation reduction in polarization is associated with an 
increase in central government debt of 3.44% of GDP. On the other hand, the mean 
ideological climate has no statistical relationship with debt. It is also noteworthy that 
amongst the control variables, the standout driver of debt is the proportion of per-
sons aged 65 and over, consistent with Song et al (2012).
Column 2 of Table  1 includes the measure of government distance, 
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Fig. 3  Scatter plot of average central government debt as a percentage of GDP and average ideological 


































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
DEBT_GDP POL
Debt and Polarization Averages 1960-2010
Fig. 4  Evolution of average central government debt as a percentage of GDP (DEBT_GDP) and average 
ideological polarization (POL) by year
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coefficient estimate on this variable should be positive. All else equal the larger 
the difference between the ideological disposition of the government and the 
ideological mean in the electorate, the greater the incentive for the government 
to increase debt. However, the estimated coefficient for this variable is negative 
(though insignificant), whilst the coefficient estimate pertaining to POL is essen-
tially unaltered in terms of size and significance. Similar findings hold in columns 
3 and 4, where GOV_DIST  is replaced by the top two-party distance measure 
( TOP2_DIST  ) and also the unweighted standard deviation of the rilepjt ideology 
measure by all parties standing at each general election (denoted RILESD ). The 
absence of evidence in support of the strategic debt hypothesis also holds in col-
umn 5 where again the estimated coefficient for GOV_DIST  is negative (though 
insignificant), whilst the coefficient estimate pertaining to POL is essentially 
unaltered in terms of size and significance.
Whilst indicative, the econometric results using annual data are potentially 
questionable because both government debt and ideological dispersion are slow 
moving variables. By construction government debt is the cumulative outcome 
of past and present deficits. The fiscal policy decision-making process is not 
instantaneous. Governments have to agree to proposals and then get them through 
Table 1  Estimation results, annual data
Panel regressions of Central Government Debt as a percentage share of GDP including LYP, PROP1564, 
PROP65, and TRADE as control variables described in Persson and Tabellini (2003). POL is the meas-
ure of ideological polarization in the electorate as described in the text. MEAN is the average left–right 
ideological score. GOV_DIST is the ideological distance between the government and the mean voter, 
TOP2_DIST is the ideological distance between the top two parties (by vote) in the election, RILESD is 
the standard deviation in ideological positioning by all the parties standing in the election. Fixed country 
and time effects are included. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are estimated by clustering errors 
by country. *, **, and ***, respectively, denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MEAN  − 0.103 (0.189)  − 0.164 (0.196)  − 0.164 (0.202)  − 0.148 (0.189)  − 0.076 (0.197)
POL  − 0.495* 
(0.259)
 − 0.484* (0.238)
GOV_DIST  − 0.220 (0.141)  − 0.114 (0.114)
TOP2_DIST  − 0.095 (0.108)
RILESD  − 0.257 (0.208)
LYP  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)
TRADE  − 0.009 (0.228)  − 0.015 (0.227) 0.025 (0.237) 0.007 (0.231)  − 0.035 (0.227)










Obs 1025 986 1016 1025 986
Data Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
No. countries 22 22 22 22 22
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71
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legislative processes. Second, there are considerable lags in the implementation 
of agreed policy. In large part policymakers inherit fiscal policy in terms of tax 
rates and thresholds as well as with particular spending commitments even in the 
case of the discretionary elements of fiscal policy. Furthermore, there are impor-
tant cyclical effects in the context of annual debt data. To overcome this problem, 
and following the standard approach taken in the empirical growth literature from 
here on we report results using 10 year averages of the data.
A further reason for taking 10  year averages is that the polarization data are 
undoubtedly measured with some error. For example, if a particular party publishes 
a relatively idiosyncratic (and perhaps unrepresentative) manifesto for a particular 
election, thereby failing to adequately represent the parties’ underlying ideological 
position, then averaging the data with adjacent elections will improve the quality 
of the ideology data. Table  2 therefore repeats the analysis of Table  1, but using 
10 year averages. Despite a smaller number of observations, the estimation results 
hold up and indeed improve in terms of estimated parameter magnitude and statisti-
cal significance (as would be expected if the polarization measure is improved). The 
estimate for b1 is now − 0.970 and is significant at the 5% level.
As in Table 1 the estimation results are quite unsupportive of the strategic debt 
hypothesis. The alternative polarization measures (in columns 2–4) find coefficient 
estimates with the wrong sign, though are statistically insignificant. Column 5 again 
adds GOV_DIST  as an additional regressor. As with the annual data government 
distance from the mean is found to be negatively (though insignificantly) corre-
lated with government debt; hence, the data are not supportive of the strategic debt 
hypothesis. Inclusion of this variable in the context of the 10-year averages data also 
leads to a slight drop in the estimated significance of POL, although the point esti-
mate is not significantly different. It is possible that GOV_DIST  is picking up some 
of the polarization effect as argued for in this paper. Most importantly in this and 
indeed in all subsequent regressions GOV_DIST  , TOP2_DIST  and RILESD were all 
found to be insignificantly related to debt and so are dropped from the analysis.
Previous empirical work investigating political determinants of fiscal policy has 
focussed on the common pool problem—which increasingly arises when the govern-
ment is constituted of broader coalitions of interest groups.25 For example, Perotti 
and Kontopoulos (2002) empirically investigate how fragmentation leads to ‘loose 
fiscal outcomes’.26 Fragmentation, which should be recognized to be quite distinct 
from polarization, is usually defined empirically in terms of the number of politi-
cal actors.27 However, because fragmentation and polarization are correlated with 
each other (the correlation coefficient is 0.23) omission of fragmentation may bias 
the polarization parameter estimate towards insignificance. In Table 3 column 1 we 
25 Weingast et al. (1981) explore how government resources are misallocated under the common pool 
problem. Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Velasco (2000) analyse the implications for debt.
26 Persson and Tabellini (2003) investigate constitutional rules and find that the average government fis-
cal cash surplus is higher under majoritarian electoral rule compared with proportional representation in 
cross-sectional data.
27 See also Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and Elgie and McMenamin (2008).
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include the number of parties in government (NPC) following this literature. A pri-
ori, the larger this number, the worse the common pool problem and the greater the 
public debt. The results confirm this hypothesis, with the parameter estimate relat-
ing to NPC exhibiting a positive sign, and which is significant at the 10% level. The 
magnitude of this estimated effect is quite large. An additional party in government 
is estimated to increase debt by 8.4% of GDP. Importantly the parameter estimate 
for POL is still negative and significant, indeed more so now that fragmentation is 
separately controlled for.
The presence of fixed country and time effects goes some way towards control-
ling for unobserved determinants of government debt. However, it is possible that 
unobserved country-specific effects may be time varying, and indeed that time 
effects are heterogeneous impact by country. To further control for unobserved 
country and time-specific factors the econometric analysis is next augmented to 
include the lagged-dependent variable. Furthermore, even within 10-year averages 
there is likely to be some persistence in the dependent variable that ideally should 
be accounted for in the analysis. Column 2 in Table 3 contains the results. The point 
estimate of b
1
 remains negative and is still statistically significant even in this quite 
demanding econometric specification.
It is possible that column 2 underestimates the effect of ideological polarization 
on public debt, due to the Nickell (1981) bias associated with models that include 
fixed effects and have a lagged-dependent variable. The bias is in the order 1/T, and 
when decadal data are used T = 5 , so this is an important consideration. To cor-
rect for this column 3 employs the Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(BCLSDV) estimator proposed by Kiviet (1995) and extended by Bruno (2005). The 
relationship between polarization and public debt remains negative and is now esti-
mated to be significant at the 5% level.
3.3  Instrumental variable regression results
The results presented so far establish a robust negative statistical relationship 
between public debt and ideological polarization—one that survives in the pres-
ence of a substantial battery of controls. However, endogeneity is still a concern 
here: possibly both variables co-move in response to an unseen third variable. Ide-
ally what is required here are plausibly exogenous movements in polarization. In 
an attempt to identify such movements we employ two instrumental variables. The 
first of these is lagged media intensity, measured as the average number of televi-
sions owned in the population in the previous 10-year period.28 In the case of the 
US Campante and Hojman (2013) found that the introduction of TV in the USA 
causally reduced ideological polarization. Using international data Melki and Pick-
ering (2014) also found that increases in media intensity statistically lead observed 
reductions in polarization. In the context of using 10-year averages, there is also 
28 These data are from the World Development Indicators.
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Table 2  Estimation results, 10-year averages
As for Table 1. *, **, and ***, respectively, denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MEAN  − 0.291 (0.397)  − 0.472 (0.393)  − 0.370 (0.202)  − 0.412 (0.380)  − 0.303 (0.413)
POL  − 0.970** 
(0.259)
 − 0.878* (0.453)
GOV_DIST  − 0.446 (0.425)  − 0.122 (0.456)
TOP2_DIST  − 0.274 (0.193)
RILESD  − 0.453 (0.419)
LYP  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)  − 0.001 (0.001)
TRADE  − 0.053 (0.228) 0.004 (0.322)  − 0.043 (0.325)  − 0.017 (0.314)  − 0.051 (0.316)










Obs 106 106 106 106 106
Data 10-year aves 10-year aves 10-year aves 10-year aves 10-year aves
No. countries 22 22 22 22 22
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77
Table 3  Estimation results—
robustness
As for Table 1. NCP is the number of parties in government coali-
tion. Djt−1 is the lagged-dependent variable. *, **, and ***, respec-
















































Obs 106 106 106
Data 10-year aves 10-year aves 10-year aves
No. countries 22 22 22
Method OLS OLS BCLSDV
R
2 0.79 0.87
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a substantial time gap between the media instrument and the polarization data so 
clearly the instrument is predetermined.
The second instrument is the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. This event clearly 
satisfies the conditions of exogeneity and plausibly had a sizeable effect on ideologi-
cal polarization, especially in Europe. Prior to this event parties of the left in Europe 
usually explicitly defined themselves as socialist, whilst parties of the left in democ-
racies outside of Europe (e.g. the USA) were generally more centrist. The event was 
a decisive signal, in simple terms, that communism had failed. As such, voters and 
indeed parties of the left in Western Europe shifted somewhat to the right. Indeed 
March and Mudde (2005) find that the decline of the ‘radical left’ in Europe dated 
from 1989. This implies an exogenous compression of ideology in European coun-
tries. Figure  5 depicts the polarization data in terms of deviation from the mean 
across time. Polarization towards the end of the sample falls in both the European 
and non-European subsample, but the reduction is greater in the European countries. 
This instrument is constructed as a dummy variable set equal to one in European 
countries post-1989 and zero elsewhere. The presence of a second instrument (that 
undoubtedly is independent of the first) also permits use of overidentification tests to 
investigate the exclusion restrictions.
Table 4 contains the estimation results of the instrumental variables regression. 
The weak instruments test is rejected at the 1% level.29 Both the Sargan and Basman 
overidentification tests are not rejected, which supports the assumptions of instru-
ment exogeneity, and the associated exclusion restrictions. Importantly polarization 
is still found to be negative and statistically significant, and indeed the magnitude 
of the estimated coefficient is increased relative to the OLS estimates. This is quite 
plausible if, for example, debt increases in ‘bad times’, which simultaneously entails 
greater polarization. The ‘bad times’ are not fully controlled for in the OLS regres-
sion and would bias the OLS estimate towards zero. When polarization is instru-
mented, then any endogenous element of polarization is in principle cleaned out, 
and a clearer picture emerges of how exogenous changes in polarization affect cho-
sen debt levels. The estimated coefficient is − 1.7, not far from the slope (− 2) in the 
scatter plot in Fig. 2. Under the conditions of instrument validity, then the estimated 
quantitative effect is quite sizeable: a one standard deviation increase in polarization 
is estimated to cause a reduction of central government debt of about 12% of GDP.
3.4  Robustness and mechanisms
Table 5 investigates robustness and also whether or not the results reported thus far 
change with economic development and government institutions. The mechanism 
proposed in the paper relates to democracy, and feasibly under non-democratic 
systems the relationship between polarization and government debt could be quite 
different. The sample analysed in this paper is the OECD—hence only relates to 
democratic systems, though countries do differ in terms of the maturity of their 
29 In the first stage regression lagged media is negative and significant with a p-value of 0.002, and the 
Berlin wall dummy is negative and significant with a p-value of 0.058.
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democracies. In column 1 the regression specification is as for column 1 of Table 3 
but the sample excludes observations from Greece, Portugal, and Spain from the 
1970s, which were all then new democracies. As can be seen the results are essen-
tially unaltered given their exclusion.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 split the sample by economic development.30 The 
theory is silent on this point, but generally voter and politician behaviour may vary 
with development, and it is in any case useful to gauge whether parameter estimates 
are stable across these subsamples. In column 2 the (relatively) high-income sam-
ple again returns a negative coefficient for polarization of a very similar magni-
tude to that found for the full sample. Statistical significance falls slightly to 7.6% 
though this is not surprising given the smaller sample. In column 3 the (relatively) 
low-income sample also returns a negative coefficient, which despite increased 
magnitude is of reduced statistical significance ( p = 0.162 ). The debt–polariza-
tion relationship is somewhat looser under lower economic development, but over-
all these results do not indicate that the parameter estimates depend on the level of 
development.
The core argument of the paper emphasizes the need to signal competence via 
higher current spending. Excessive government debt arises out of a political process 
with information asymmetries. Both in principle and in practice there may be insti-
tutional defences against the debt distortion. In order to investigate this empirically 
we make use of the ‘Government Efficiency’ (GOVEF) data produced by Kaufman 
et al (2009). These data ‘captur(e) perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pres-
sures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to such policies’.31 We believe this institutional meas-
ure (or its objective at least) should in principle qualify the capacity for incumbents 
to suboptimally increase debt. In particular, a high quality and independent civil ser-
vice may be more able to make financing decisions independently and indeed resist 
short-termist political demands for debt. Consequently, albeit somewhat tentatively, 
it may be hypothesized that countries which score highly on this measure might 
exhibit a weaker debt–polarization relationship than those which do not.
The GOVEF data are only available from 1996 to 2012. Furthermore, there is 
not much in the way of within-country variation.32 To make matters simple we take 
the average GOVEF score for each country, rank them in order, and then divide the 
sample of 22 countries into two groups of 11 thereby creating a low government 
efficiency subsample and a high government efficiency subsample. This ordering 
and grouping can be seen in Table 6. Globally these data in principle range from 
− 2.5 to + 2.5, and there is quite a lot of variation even across the OECD sample on 
this measure. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 contain estimation results for these two 
subsamples. Column (4) is the high government efficiency group of countries. Here 
30 Determined by the median value of real GDP per capita.
31 Kaufman et al. (2009). Italics added.
32 This is not surprising given that the measure is a function of institutional quality, and that institutions 
are slow to change.
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the estimated relationship between debt and polarization, whilst still negative, is 
now much reduced in terms of statistical significance (p = 0.268). In the low govern-
ment efficiency group of countries (column 5) the parameter estimate is much larger 
in terms of magnitude and is statistically significant at the 8% level. The results are 
reliant on quite a small dataset, but nonetheless there is a degree of support for the 
conjecture that the debt–polarization relationship is stronger in the low government 
efficiency countries.
A final institutional qualification to the results relates to fiscal transparency. Alt 
and Lassen (2006) find that fiscal transparency plays a substantial direct role in cur-
tailing debt accumulation and the electoral mechanisms underpinning debt accumu-
lation that rely on imperfect information would potentially be changed given differ-
ent degrees of transparency of fiscal policy. Again these data are not time varying, 
but in the same spirit as the above exercise we split the sample on the median and 
examine how the debt–polarization relationship changes with fiscal transparency. 
The data are taken from Fig. 1 of Alt and Lassen (2006), with countries split accord-
ing to fiscal transparency scores of 4 or more, against score strictly less than 4. Fis-
cal transparency is quite distinct from government efficiency—the correlation coef-
ficient between the two series is positive but quite small at 0.129, so the sample split 
is quite different from that for government efficiency.
The estimation results for the two subsample are presented in columns (6) and (7) 
of Table 5. Interestingly the estimation results for the more transparent subsample 
yield a stronger negative coefficient estimate for polarization. First note that on a 
formal statistical test the difference in the coefficient estimates for POL in columns 
(6) and (7) is not statistically significant, and also that the subsample for the less 
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Ideological Polarization trends, EU and non-EU, 1950-2008
Fig. 5  Ideological Polarization trends, EU and non-EU, 1950–2008. The series are constructed as fol-
lows: First, within each country demeaned polarization data are constructed by subtracting the country-
level average from each observation to remove country-specific fixed effects. Second, the demeaned 
series are averaged across each geographic area for each year.
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that the transparency ‘treatment’ is problematic in that it is typically Anglo-Saxon 
countries that score highly on the Alt and Lassen (2006) measure. These countries 
are to a greater extent characterized by two-party competition where potentially vot-
ers are more responsive to economic policy platforms relative to voting under multi-
party systems.
4  Conclusions
It is widely recognized that high levels of public debt arise out of imperfections 
in the political process. Undoubtedly, as established by Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988), a key weakness in any democratic system is imperfect informa-
tion regarding politician quality. Competent incumbents are compelled into debt in 
order to signal their quality. This tendency is reduced when ideological polarization 
increases because voters are less responsive to changes in fiscal policy: hence, the 
hypothesis that polarization leads to lower debt levels. This prediction opposes the 
strategic debt argument of Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson 
Table 4  Instrumental variable 
estimation results
Instrumental variables regression of Central Government Debt on 
ideological polarization using media intensity measures and the Ber-
lin Wall dummy variable (described in the text) as instruments. *, 




















 (Sargan) 2 = 2.666 ( p = 0.103)
 (Basman) 2 = 1.464 ( p = 0.225)
Weak inst F = 5.703 ( p = 0.007)
R
2 0.92
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Table 5  Robustness and extensions
As for Table 1. Column 1 excludes Greece, Portugal and Spain observations from the 1970s. Columns 2 
and 3, respectively, correspond to higher- and lower-income levels ( LYP≷22801.64 .) Columns 4 and 5, 
respectively, correspond to higher and lower levels of average ‘government efficiency’ ( GOVEF≷1.74 .) 
Columns 6 and 7, respectively, correspond to higher ( ≥ 4 ) and lower ( < 4 ) levels of the Alt and Lassen 
fiscal transparency score. *, **, and ***, respectively, denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%




















































































































22 21 21 11 11 11 8
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.78 0.95 0.89 0.79 0.85 0.73 0.85
Table 6  Average government 
efficiency ranking
GOVEF is average ‘Government Efficiency’ 1996–2012, using data 
measured and described in Kaufman et  al. (2009). *, **, and ***, 
respectively, denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%
Country GOVEF Country GOVEF
Denmark 2.139 Belgium 1.727
Finland 2.137 UK 1.725
Sweden 1.990 USA 1.640
Switzerland 1.972 Germany 1.638
Norway 1.920 Ireland 1.569
Netherlands 1.894 France 1.561
Canada 1.868 Japan 1.329
Iceland 1.841 Spain 1.326
Austria 1.817 Portugal 1.072
New Zealand 1.775 Greece 0.651
Australia 1.749 Italy 0.561
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(1989) where polarization is predicted to increase debt. Using ideology data taken 
from manifestos we find a robust negative empirical relationship between observed 
debt and polarization. This negative relationship is strengthened when fractional-
ized politics are controlled for and sustains in instrumental variable regressions. The 
negative debt–polarization relationship is estimated to be independent of income, 
though as conjectured it is found to be somewhat stronger when ‘government effi-
ciency’ is lower.
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